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TRUST INVESTMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA
D. W. MARKIHAM*

The events of the depression and the fear of inflation have precipitated efforts to make more flexible the provisions of trust instruments
and of statutes restrictive of trust investments.' Where the settlor or
the law has left the trustee relatively free, the wise investment of trust
funds depends even more upon the ability to cope successfully with controlling economic forces. Nevertheless, both the investment expert and
the only occasionally concerned lawyer and judge must contend with
trust investments in an arena shaped by the law. What of the law of
trust investments in North Carolina?
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ordinarily, a'trustee has the duty, not only to preserve the corpus,
but to make it productive.2 Which of these objects is to receive primary
* Student Editor-in-Chief, NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW.

The depression brought a multitude of problems to acting trustees, especially
those who were confined within narrow investment limits by the directions of the
settlor. See Leach, Les'sons from the Depression in the Drafting of Wills and
Trusts (1933) 18 MINN. L. REv. 27; Baker, The Growing Complexity of Fidilciary
Investing (1933)

56 TRUST COMPANIES 11.

That trustees are concerned about the possibility of inflation is evident from
(1933) 57 TRUST ComPANIEs 620, and Benner, Effect of Inflation Program on
Life Insurance and Fiduciary Investments (1933) 56 TRUST COMPANIES 529. See
also It re Muller's Will, 280 N. Y. Supp. 345 (Surr. Ct. 1935) where testamentary
trustees, who were limited to "legals," petitioned the court for permission to invest
35% of a trust fund of $400,000 in common stocks as a hedge against inflation.
Petition denied.
A view of recent legislative trends is to be found in Legis. (1934) 19 IowA L.
REv. 354. The law of other jurisdictions is outlined in 3 BooERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES (1935) §615 et seq.; McKINNEY, TRUST INVEST1ENTS (2d ed. 1927) 45
et seq.; LORING, TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK (4th ed. 1928) 143 et seq.

'See Gary v. Cannon, 38 N. C. 64, 69 (1843) ; Green v. Rountree, 88 N. C. 164,
166 (1883); Wilson v. Lineberger, 88 N. C. 416, 431 (1883); Sheets v. Tobacco
Co., 195 N. C. 149, 153, 141 S. E. 355, 357 (1928) ; 3 BOGERT, op. Cit. supra note 1,
§611; McKixNEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20; LORING, op. cit. slpra note 1, at 132;
1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §§176, 181.
A natural corollary of this duty is the liability for interest if he fails to perform
his duty, or for the income which the estate reasonably should have produced (in
the case of land, etc.). Branch v. Arrington, 4 N. C. 230 (1815) ; Ryan v. Blount,
16 N. C. 382 (1830) ; Finch v. Ragland, 17 N. C. 137 (1831) ; Hodge v. Hawkins,
21 N. C. 564 (1837) ; Peyton v. Smith, 22 N. C. 325 (1839); Spruill v. Cadnon, 22
N. C. 400 (1839) ; Ford v. Vandyke, 33 N. C. 227 (1850); Spack v. Long, 36 N. C.
426 (1841) ; see Gary v. Cannon, 38 N. C. 64, 69 (1843); cf. Chambers v. Kerns,
59 N. C. 280 (1862). Also Suddereth v. McCombs, 65 N. C. 186 (1871) ; Johnston
v. Haynes, 68 N. C. 509 (1873); McNeill v. Hodges, 83 N. C. 505 (1880) ; Pickens
v. Miller, 83 N. C. 544 (1880); Wilson v. Lineberger, 88 N. C. 416 (1883) ; State
ex rel. Carr v. Askew, 94 N. C. 194 (1886) ; Grant v. Reese, 94 N. C. 720 (1886) ;
Smith v. Smith, 101 N. C. 461, 8 S. E. 128 (1888); Coggins v. Flythe, 113 N. C.
103, 18 S. E. 165 (1893) ; Fisher v. Brown, 135 N. C. 198, 47 S. E. 398 (1904); 3
BOGERT, op. cit. supra, §707; McKiNNEY, loc. cit. sitpra; LORING, oc. cit. supra.
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consideration will depend in each case upon the purposes for which the
trust was set up, the size of the fund, the condition of the beneficiaries,
and perhaps other circumstances. Every investment which a conscientious trustee makes should reflect an evaluation of those purposes, and
represent his best judgment as to how they may be most surely accomplished. In the average case, he will select the security which shows
promise of yielding the greatest possible income consistent with the
greatest possible safety for the principal.
The field of investments from which the trustee may choose is, in
the first instance, defined by the provisions in the instrument from which
he derives his authority. 3 The variety of provisions, both permissive
4
and mandatory, which a settlor may make is, of course, unlimited.
Under ordinary circumstances, the trustee will be protected if he follows scrupulously the settlor's directions. 5 Situations may arise, however, when the trustee will have, not only the power, but the duty to
disregard the terms of the instrument. 6 The greatest problem-and the
one with which we are here primarily concerned-arises when the settlor
makes no provision covering investments, or when he leaves the whole
7
matter in the trustee's discretion.
It should be recognized, before we get into a discussion of the apoplicable legal guides and restrictions in this State, that scores of trust
investment problems have arisen in other jurisdictions which are not
covered by the North Carolina statutes and which have never been
presented to our Court for decision. No attempt will 'be made herein to
deal with those problems.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Section 40188 of the North Carolina Code provides: "Guardians,
executors, administrators, and others acting in a fiduciary capacity....
may invest in United States bonds, or any securities for which the
United States are responsible, farm loan bonds issued by Federal land
banks, or in bonds of the state of North Carolina issued since the year
13 BOGERT,op. cit. supra note 1, §681 ; McKINNEY, loc. cit. supra note 2; LORING,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 136.
'See Hester v. Hester, 16 N. C. 328, 331 (1829) where the Court says: "The
creator of the trust may prescribe what rules (for the government of the trustee]
he pleases."

3 BOGERT, loc. cit. supra note 3.
loc. cit. supra note 3; MCKINNEY, loc. cit. supra note 2.
'See Fisher v. Fisher, 170 N. C. 378, 381, 87 S. E. 113, 115 (1915) ; Middleton
v. Rigsbee, 179 N. C. 437, 102 S. E. 780 (1920) ; Commercial Nat. Bk. v. Alexander,
188 N. C. 667, 125 S. E. 385 (1924) (not an investment case) ; Scott, Deviation
from the Terms of a Trust (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1025; 3 BOGERT, loc. cit. supra
note 3, and §688.
'3 BOGERT, op. cit. mpra note 1, §§682-3; McKINNEY, loc. cit. supra note 2;
LORING, loc. cit. supra note 3; 1 RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) §227; Note (1926)
26 COL. L. Ray. 453.
'All references to "sections" are to sections of N. C. CODE (1935).

*3

BOGERT,
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1872; or in drainage bonds duly issued under the provisions of article
8 of [the] chapter entitled Drainage; . . ." This section further provides that, "in settlements by guardians, executors, administrators, trustees, and others acting in a fiduciary capacity," such securities "shall
be deemed cash to the amount actually paid for same, including the
premium, if any, paid for such bonds or other securities, and may be
paid as such by the transfer thereof to the persons entitled." The significance of this cash-equivalent clause will be discussed further on.
Section 4018 (a) authorizes the same classes of fiduciaries to invest
"in bonds issued by any county, city, town or school district of the state
of North Carolina subsequent to January first, 1915, provided that the
net debt of such county, city, town or school district does not exceed
ten per cent of the assessed valuation of the property therein subject to
taxation for the payment of such bonds." This section also includes a
cash-equivalent clause.
Section 4018 (b) permits fiduciaries to invest in "stock of any building and loan association organized and licensed under the laws of this
state" if so authorized by the insurance commissioner. No cashequivalent clause is added. Section 5207 (v) makes bonds of a land
mortgage association "a legal investment" for trustees.
Section 220 (a) 19 is partially repetitious of Section 4018 in providing that fiduciaries "may" invest in bonds issued, or fully and unconditionally guaranteed as to principal and interest, by the United States.
Like Section 4018, this section carries a cash-equivalent clause, with
the added provision that such bonds may be paid over to the persons
entitled "without any liability for a greater rate of interest than the
amount actually accruing from such bonds."
Under Section 6243 (25), fiduciaries "may legally invest" in housing
authority bonds "when they are secured by a first pledge of the revenues
of, or a first mortgage lien on, property, which pledge or lien does not
exceed sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the value of such property." Section 220 (a) 2 (1) provides that "it shall be lawful" for trustees to invest in "bonds or notes secured by a mortgage or deed of trust
insured by the federal housing -administrator," in "mortgages or real
estate which have been accepted for insurance by the federal housing
administrator," and in "obligation[s] of national mortgage associations
organized under Title III of the National Housing Act." Subsection
(2) permits fiduciaries to "make such loans, secured by real estate, as
the federal housing administrator has insured or has made a commitment to insure." 10
9

See (1935)

13 N. C. L. REv. 441.

10Ibid.
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Section 2308 gives guardians the "power"" to lend any portion of
the estates of their wards "upon bond with sufficient security to be repaid with interest annually," but requires that "all the bonds, notes, or
other obligations which he shall take as guardian shall bear compound
interest." As will appear later, the Supreme Court has recognized personal security, and mortgages on land or chattels as satisfying the
12
requirements of "sufficient security.'
Apparently, the provision requiring compound interest 13 refers only
to personal bonds and notes taken under this section. The other statutory provisions to which we have referred, for the most part, specifically
include guardians, and the investments there authorized do not bear
compound interest.
Numerous other sections will be found scattered through the Code,
permitting fiduciaries to invest in various issues of State bonds and
notes.' 4 These scattered provisions are appended to the acts authorizing the respective issues, for the purpose, no doubt, of increasing the
"1The section was previously mandatory. REv. CoDE (1854) c. 54, §23. See
Smith v. Gilmer, 64 N. C. 546, 548 (1870).
" Boyett v. Hurst, 54 N. C. 167 (1854) ("... the security meant is personal
security . . .") ; State ex rel. Whitford v. Foy, 65 N. C. 265 (1871) (". . . we do
not think that . . . [personal security] was the only form of security which a
guardian could take . . . "--after discussing real property security). The decision in the latter case held a guardian not liable for taking a mortgage on slaves
as security.
'The requirement ceases with the termination of the guardianship. Wood v.
Brownrigg, 14 N. C. 430 (1832) (marriage of female ward) ; Ryan v. Blount, 16
N. C. 382 (1830) (death of guardian) ; Mitchell v. Robards, 17 N. C. 478 (1833);
State ex rel. Carr v. Askew, 94 N. C. 194 (1886) (death of ward).
1'IN. C. CoDE (1935)
§§3772 (k) (highway bonds and notes) ; 3846 (qq) 10
(highway bonds and notes) ; 3846 (qq) 21 (highway bonds and notes) ; 7343 (industrial school for women bonds) ; 7343 (z) (industrial farm colony for women
bonds and notes) ; 7431 (refunding bonds) ; 7432 (i) (general fund notes) ; 7436
(state hospital bonds); 7439 (state building bonds); 7443 (state debt bonds);
7451 (improvement bonds); 7456 (North Carolina Railroad renewal bonds);
7458 (anticipation notes) ; 7462 (improvement bonds) ; 7467 (anticipation notes);
7472 (e) (state institution bonds) ; 7472 (i) (anticipation notes) ; 7472 (n) (state
institution bonds) ; 7472 (if) (funding bonds) ; 7472 (nn) (funding bonds) ; 7472
(ww) (special building fund bonds); 7472 (10) (refunding bonds); 7763 (k)
(state prison bonds and notes) ; 5754 (6) (notes for state text book purchase and
rental system). The cash-equivalent clause of §4018 also specifically mentions
bonds issued under §§3600-3607. See also §7418.
§4018 (c) permits guardians to invest in securities within the classes designated
by §§4018 and 4018 (a), registered as to principal only in the name of the ward.
See also §4019.
§2174 (1) provides for special proceedings enabling guardians, under certain
conditions, to buy in real estate on foreclosure of mortgages or deeds of trust held
by them.
Cf. the investment statutes governing banks (§220 (a) - (e)); insurance companies (§6334) ; fraternal benefit societies (§6512); co5perative non-profit life
benefit associations (§6476 (q)); Torren's Law assurance fund (§2422); North
Carolina State Thrift Society (§1125 (k)); sinking funds (§§7472 (q) 4-5);
credit unions (§§5219-20) ; building and loan associations (§5182) ; cemetery funds
(§5027) ; clerks of court (§§962 (a)-(c)). See (1931) 9 N. C. L. Rav. 399, and
(1935) 13 id. 441.
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salability of the issue. The language "may invest" and "it shall be lawful to invest" is used indiscriminately. One section1 5 is unusual in that
it includes the provision that fiduciaries "shall not be liable for any
loss which may be incurred by reason of investing therein."
A brief review of the statutes referred to will disclose that they are
all permissive in terms. As guides to a doubtful trustee, they therefore
serve to suggest limits within which he may safely10 make a choice. But
it will be noticed that the limits suggested are rather narrow. They include the field of bonds issued or guaranteed by the federal government,
bonds of this State and its subdivisions, and certain other types of
strictly local securities. There is much to be said in favor of restricting
trust investments to those of a local character. 17 There is, however, at
least one cogent argument in favor of increasing the area of choice.
The greater the number from which a choice may be made, the greater
the likelihood that the trustee can find the particular type of investment
to meet the needs of his particular trust. Of course the argument loses
some force in the face of the fact that the statutory classification is not
iron-bound. Nevertheless, where trustees are so often unacquainted
with the intricate data relating to investments, it is believed that statutory lists, even though only permissive, do, and should have, suggestive
weight.
With what degree of safety may a trustee choose from the statutory
list? The answer is somewhat uncertain in North Carolina. A dictim
of the Supreme Court in a recent case suggests that if the investment
was made under "statutory authority," there would be no liability for
losses resulting therefrom "in the absence of fraud or gross negli-

gence."' 8 It is unlikely that the Court would attempt to differentiate
between statutory "permission" and statutory "authority." Probably,
therefore, all of the statutes referred to constitute statutory "authority,"
within the Court's meaning. That being so, there remains the question
as to what, if any, distinction the Court would make between those sections which include a cash-equivalent clause (or the section containing a
seemingly complete immunity from liability) and those which include
no such language. Undoubtedly, the cash-equivalent clause was intended to give the trustee a blanket guaranty against liability, for if
securities may be distributed at their inventory or cost valuation, there
couldn't even be a showing of loss. It is difficult to believe that the
'5§7472
(if). See also §7418.
"6 See next paragraph. See also 3 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 1, §614.
' See Cobb v. Fountain, infra (Loans on Mortgage Security), and cases discussed in connection with deposits in foreign banks (Bank Deposits.) Also McKiNxFy,op. cit. supra note 1, at 41.
' That probably accords with the general rule elsewhere. See 3 BOGERT, loc. cit.
supra note 16.
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Court would refrain from reading the requirements of good faith and
due care into even those sections.' 9 The safest conclusion would seem
to be, therefore, that no significance would be attached to the presence
or absence of the cash-equivalent clause, but in all cases, the trustee who
had invested in securities designated by statute would be prima facie
protected, until fraud or gross negligence were shown.
DEcm CAsEs
When the trustee leaves the statute book and turns to the reports of
decided cases in search of assistance, he will find very little that is
sufficiently definite to point the way. Over a long line of cases, the
Court has adhered to the general rule that a trustee must exercise complete good faith and the sound discretion that a prudent man would
show in the management of his own affairs. 20 The decision in the most
recent case of importance 2l expanded upon the statement, by adding
that the investment must represent the trustee's best judgment, arrived
at in good faith and after the exercise of due diligence, that it will
secure the principal of the fund and yield a reasonable income.
The rule in this State has not undergone the refinements of expression that are to be found in some of the cases elsewhere. 22 The net
result is very probably the same. A more precise statement of the
standard does not compel a more precise application of it, especially
when a court must look backward to determine what a "reasonably
prudent business man" would have done with his money or someone
else's at a particular time under the then circumstances.
Although a review of the cases may not point out with any certainty
what a trustee nay do, it will indicate perhaps things which he may not
do, and at the same time illustrate the way in which the general rule has
been applied.
"So far as has been discovered, the Court has never attempted to graduate the
care required in different situations. Whether it would require, in terms at least,
a lesser degree of care where the investment appears on the statutory list than
where it does not is an unanswered question. If it should do so, it would simply
be inviting trouble for itself in applying such a variable standard.
" Practically all of the cases hereafter referred to or cited contain statements
of the rule. It was early stated by the Court as follows: "In the absence of ...
[a rule prescribed by the settlor], the law enjoins good faith, which includes not
only what is commonly understood by honesty and integrity, but care, diligence, and
attention, and in matters of judgment and discretion, that they should be carefully
applied." Hester v. Hester, 16 N. C. 328 (1829) at 331.
Sheets v. Tobacco Co., 195 N. C. 149, 141 S. E. 355 (1928).
'In Sargent, Evolution of Trust Investment Principles (1934) 58 TRUST COM-PAN Es 711, the Massachusetts rule is traced through various stages of refinement
of expression. There are variations as to whether the trustee should act with the
*prudence of one handling his own money, or of one handling someone else's money;
and as to whether the trustee shall be judged by the knowledge that he has, or by
that 'which he should reasonably have. See 1 RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) §227
and comments. (The vagueness of the discussion in the Restatement lends weight
to the observation in the text.)
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Confederate Securities and Currency:
While this field of trust investments is now ancient history, two
purposes can be served by a glance at the cases. (1) The question was
presented to the Court so often that the decisions on it probably represent the best rounded branch of trust investment law in the State. It
is, therefore, an ideal illustration of the application of the general
standard. (2) With the air heavy with inflation talk, the power of a
trustee to deal in depreciated currency, and securities payable in such
currency, may not be a subject of purely academic interest.
The cases under this heading can be roughly divided into three
groups: (1) where a fiduciary accepted Confederate currency on behalf
of his estate; (2) where he deliberately avoided accepting such currency; and (3) where he invested in Confederate securities.
1. In Gibbs v. Gibbs,2 3 a guardian was held liable for accepting payment of a good note in November, 1863, in Confederate currency, then
worth only six or eight cents on the dollar.
In State ex rel. Cummings v. Mebane,2 4 a guardian loaned estate
funds to a solvent person on good security. In December, 1862, the
principal being about to leave the state, the guardian accepted payment
in Confederate currency, which he was forced to retain because of inability to reinvest. He was held not liable for accepting it under the
circumstances, (but was charged for having mingled it with his personal
funds). The Court says :25
"It is one thing to sit in judgment upon the past, and quite another
to foresee consequences. It will not do to look back now and see how
estates might have been better managed, and exact of those who had
them in charge that degree of diligence which would have proved most
beneficial in each particular case.
"The degree of diligence to which we think they should be held liable
is that which a prudent man at that time would have exercised in the
management of his own affairs."
In Shuford v. Ramsoir,26 the "agent" for a minor loaned his ward's
entire state, in 1858, to a firm of which we was a member, and took the
firm note. In April, 1863, while the firm was perfectly solvent, and
without any insistence upon the part of the debtor, he accepted payment
of the note in Confederate currency. He was surcharged, not having
acted as a "prudent man."
The administrator of a guardian at first refused a tender of Confederate currency, made in May, 1863, in payment of a note due his
decedent. The debtor insisted that such currency was legal tender, and
the administrator recalled having heard that it was an indictable offense
-61 N. C. 471 (1868).
- 63 N. C.315 (1869).
"Id. at 317.

-63 N. C. 622 (1869).
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to refuse to accept it. The decision in State ex rel. Wells v. Sluder27
was that he was not justified in later receiving the tendered currency.
(The Court may well have been influenced by the further showing that
the administrator did not keep the guardian's personal estate separate
from that held as fiduciary.)
In Freemain v. Wilson1 s a guardian rented out slaves and land belonging to the estate and received payment in Confederate money. He
also accepted payment of sundry notes in such currency. Most of the
money so received was used for current expenditures. The Court held
him not liable for the exercise of his "honest discretion," and also relieved him from liability for having exchanged the reasonable amount
of currency he had on hand for a new issue.
The cases above reviewed are typical of the numerous others presented
to the Court following the Civil War. 29 The test applied is the simple
70 N. C. 55 (1874), construed in 72 N. C. 435 (1875).
:s74 N. C. 368 (1876).
' Compare the following: Donnell v. Donnell, 62 N. C. 148 (1867) (A trustee
held a note for $2500, due before the War. In 1863, at a time when the money
was not needed, and when both principal and surety were solvent, he accepted

payment in Confederate notes and notes of individuals mostly due after 1861.
Held, liable.) ; Shipp v. Hettrick, 63 N. C. 329 (1869) (An executor was held not
liable for receiving Confederate currency in 1862 and 1863, but was liable for not
investing it, and for mingling it with his own moneys.) ; Hurdle v. Leath, 63 N. C.
'597 (1869) (A guardian was liable for receiving "bank notes" "just before the
surrender".) ; Suddereth v. McCombs, 65 N. C. 186 (1871) [Dicta (at 188-9) that
a guardian was justified in receiving North Carolina Treasury notes in May, 1864,
but was not justified in receiving $800 in Confederate currency in 1865.]; State
ex rel. Whitford v. Foy, 65 N. C. 265 (1871) (A guardian was not liable for
having received "bank notes" and Confederate notes prior to 1862, and for having
held them, safe investment being impossible.) ; Jurney v. Cowan, 67 N. C. 393
(1872) (In 1862, during negotiations for surrendering his trust, a trustee liquidated
well-secured notes and invested the Confederate currency received in Confederate
bonds. Held, liable.) ; Winstead v. Stanfield, 68 N. C. 40 (1873) [A guardian,
from December, 1862, to the beginning of 1864, accepted Confederate currency and
"bank bills" and mingled them with his own funds. In January, 1864, he sold
$150 of the. "bank bills" for $412.58 in Confederate currency. In March, he invested $1000 in a Confederate bond. He also loaned out estate funds in his own
name and used them in his own business. Held, liable for converting the funds
at the time received, (and perhaps other grounds).]; Larkins v. Murphy, 71 N. C.
560 (1874) [By dictum (at 561), an administrator who accepted part payments of
Confederate currency on a well-secured pre-war note during 1863 and 1864, without
any need for the money, was liable. But settled by agreement.] ; Love v. Johnson,
72 N. C. 415 (1875) [By dictum (at 420), had a guardian accepted a tender of
Confederate currency, made in the summer or fall of 1863, when it had become so
depreciated as to be notice to trustees not to receive it on well-secured pre-war
notes, he would have violated his trust.]; State ex rel. Lippard v. Roseman, 72
N. C. 427 (1875) (An administrator sold slaves in August, 1863, for Confederate
currency, which he mingled with his own, and apparently used in his own business.
He made loans in his own name, and kept no account of the share of estate funds
used in making the loans. Held, liable.) ; State ex rel. Wells v. Sluder, 72 N. C.
435 (1875) [The Court says (at 437) : ". . persons acting in a fiduciary character
and receiving Confederate money are to be charged only with its value at the date
of the receipt, unless it was received so late in the war as to amount to notice
that the cestui que trust would not receive it."] ; State ex rel. Armfield v. Brown,
73 N. C. 81 (1875) (A guardian, in November, 1863, when Confederate currency
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one of comparing the fiduciary's conduct with that of "reasonably prudent business men" in handling their private affairs, giving due consideration to peculiar circumstances. Just how successful the Court was
in putting itself into the shoes of the fiduciary at the particular time,
(thereby avoiding the application of the "hindsight" test), will appear
more dearly in the next group of cases.
2. In 1861, a guardian recovered judgment against parties who were
then solvent and remained so during the War. Rather than collect the
had depreciated to $15 for $1 in gold, received such currency in payment of his
wards' interest in their father's estate. Held, liable.) ; Dockery v. French, 73 N. C.
420 (1875) (In February, 1864, a guardian accepted in payment of a debt of $5820,
which was secured by a deed of trust on land and slaves, Confederate currency
then worth $227.14. Held, liable. The transaction was prima facie fraudulent, the
Court thought.) ; Suddereth v. McCombs, 79 N. C. 398 (1878), reaff'd on)rehearing, 82 N. C. 535 (1880) (Between 1861 and April, 1863, a guardian converted
"bank bills," then on a par with gold, and solvent notes into Confederate currency,
which he later converted into Confederate certificates of indebtedness. Held, the
first conversion was wrongful. Pressure of public opinion was no justification.) ;
McNeill v. Hodges, 83 N. C. 505 (1880) (A guardian was not liable for accepting
Confederate currency at the end of 1863 and 1864 in payment of rents and hires.) ;
Robertson v. Wall, 85 N. C. 284 (1881) (A guardian converted well-secured prewar bonds into Confederate currency between September, 1861, and July, 1863.
Upon finding it impossible to make private loans, and after consulting competent
advisors, he invested the estate funds, as well as his own, in Confederate bonds.
Held, not liable.) ; Burke v. Turner, 85 N. C. 500 (1881) (A guardian was not
liable for receiving Confederate currency in December, 1862, from the administrator of the estate of his ward's father, but was liable for failing to invest it,
mingling it with his own, and using it for his own purposes.) ; Covington v. Lattimore, 88 N. C. 407 (1883) [Executors collected claims due the estate during 1861
and 1862 in Confederate currency, and, not being able to loan it out, invested in
Confederate certificates. Held, not liable. One executor was a debtor of the
testator. He paid the debt to his co-executor in Confederate currency, and, on
the same day, received it back as part of the estate. Held, liable, even though his
good faith was conceded. He knew that he (as debtor) was solvent and the debt
secure, and (as executor) had no right to receive Confederate currency which he
knew could not be loaned out.]; Summers v. Reynolds, 95 N. C. 404 (1886) [An
executor arranged with his business partner to buy certain real estate to be sold
by the estate in October, 1863. He made no public announcement of the kind of
money that would be accepted, but in answer to private inquiries, stated that the
sale would be for good money. An agent of the partnership bid in the property at
$3000 Confederate currency (others who had wanted to bid in that kind of money
having refrained). Held, liable.]; Coggins v. Flythe, 113tN. C. 103, 18 S. E. 96
(1893) [A guardian who rented land and slaves in 1865 for cash (Confederate)
was not liable.]; Dunn v. Dunn, 137 N. C. 533, 50 S.E. 212 (1905) (A trustee who
failed to keep trust funds separate from his own during the War was not protected
by the depreciation of Confederate currency.).
Compare the results of these cases with the rule-of-thumb laid down in
Emerson v. Mallett, 62 N. C. 234, 236 (1867) :

".

.

. as a general rule, an officer

might have received ... [Confederate currency] up to 1863, and ought not to
have received . . . [it] after 1863, upon ante-war debts; and . . . 1863 is debatable

ground."
For cases involving the power of a collecting officer to receive such currency,
see Emerson v. Mallett, supra; Greenlee v. Suddereth, 65 N. C. 470 (1871) ; Baird
v. Hall, 67 N. C. 230 (1872); Utley v. Young, 68 N. C. 387 (1873) ; Johnson v.
'*Haynes, 68 N. C. 509 (1873); Purvis v. Jackson, 69 N. C. 474 (1873) ; Patton v.
Farmer, 87 N. C. 337 (1882). The same rule of prudence is applied in these
cases.
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judgment in Confederate currency and reinvest it, he directed the clerk
not to issue execution. After the War, the judgment debtors failed
and left the state. The guardian died in 1866, and his estate was not
charged. 30 Under the cases in the preceding group, prudent business
men were accepting Confederate money, at least during the early years
of the War, and the guardian would undoubtedly have been protected
had he promptly enforced his judgment. Either some prudent business
men were accepting Confederate currency, and others equally prudent
were not, or else the Court is influenced by the "hindsight" realization
that the money would have been lost whichever course the guardian
chose.
In Donnell v. Donnel,31 a trustee held a bond of A and B, due in
1858. A left the country insolvent in 1861. B died insolvent in 1865,
having been considered failing for two or three years. The trustee was
not charged. The Court said that even though one of the debtors had
failed, the more prudent course was to rely upon the other's credit, and
32
not try to collect it in depreciated currency.
3. In Cobb v. Taylor,33 executors received Confederate currency
during the years 1861 and 1862, and up to February, 1863. Because
communications had been cut off, they were unable to distribute the
estate to legatees residing outside the State, and, finding that the currency was depreciating, they invested it in State Treasury notes and
Confederate certificates of deposit. They were not held liable. But in
State ex rel. Purser v. Simpson,34 a guardian who collected well-secured
pre-war notes in Confederate currency in September and October, 1863,
and bought Confederate bonds at a discount was held liable for the
loss. And by dictum in Suddereth v. McCombs,35 a guardian was
justified in investing Confederate currency in Confederate 'bonds, certificates of deposit, and State Treasury notes as late as March, 1864.
'State ex rel. White v. Robinson, 64 N. C. 698 (1870).
"62 N. C. 148 (1867).
Compare the following: Covington v. Leak, 67 N. C. 363 (1872) (A guardian
recovered a judgment against administrators in October, 1863. He refused to receive Confederate currency in payment, and did not enforce 'payment before his
death in 1868. The sureties on the administrators' bond remained solvent. Held,
no negligence.); McNeill v. Hodges, 83 N. C. 505 (1880) (During 1858 and 1859,
a guardian accepted notes as payment for the hire of slaves. The makers were
land-owners, and, considering the debt secure, the guardian did not try to enforce
payment during the War. It was held that he was negligent in failing to obtain
security for the debts.) ; Jennings v. Copeland, 90 N. C. 572 (1884) (A guardian
received a note in 1863 from the prior guardian. In holding him not liable for

failure to enforce payment before the debtors failed at the end of the War, the
Court said it was not the duty of a fiduciary to collect well-secured debts in
depreciated currency.).

*64 N. C. 193 (1870).
"65 N. C. 497 (1871).

"65 N. C. 186, 187-8 (1871).
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The Court's language in Green v. Rountree3 c shows that the same
test is applied in these cases:
"No trustee will be held for loss, who acts in good faith and manages
his trust funds with that degree of diligence which prudent business
men, similarly situated, use in the conduct of their own affairs."
In that case, the trustee invested Confederate currency in Confederate
bonds in the spring of 1863. The Court, in holding that he was not
liable, suggests that it was his duty to invest the fund in some way, and
he could find no other.
In Pearsonv. Caldwell,37 a guardian had purchased 6% bonds of the
State of North Carolina in 1858. In the latter part of 1862, he exchanged them for 8's. The Court thought that the exchange could not
be said "to have been grossly (if at all under the circumstances then

existing), imprudent or injudicious."
In Longmire v. Herndon,38 a guardian received $3000 in Confederate
currency, in December, 1862, in payment of a well-secured pre-war note,
and invested it in Confederate 7-30 bonds. In holding him not liable,
the Court points out that prudent business men were doing the same
thing, and that the guardian made the same investment of his own
funds.3 9

CorporateStocks:
In Washington v. Emery,40 a testamentary trustee held the unsecured note of one B whose credit was generally considered good but
who was known as a speculator. The trustee converted the note into
sixty shares of Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Company stock. The
stock had been paying dividends for many years, at the rate of 7% for
several years preceding the investment. The road was an established
one, and the trustee consulted competent advisors before making the
change. The Court held that he should be credited with the value of
the stock on his account. It is difficult to believe that the Court was
not influenced by the fact that B failed after the change, and that no
-88 N. C. 164, 166 (1883)
70 N. C. 291 (1874).

-72 N. C. 629 (1875).

'In Suddereth v. McCombs, 79 N. C. 398 (1878), the Court says (at 400) that
the conversion of Confederate currency into Confederate certificates of indebtedness in 1863 was blameless, for they were equal. See also Robertson v. Wall, 85
N. C. 284 (1881), supra note 29; Patton v. Farmer, 87 N. C. 337 (1882), where a
clerk had received Confederate currency for the purchase money due on a partition
sale, which, after the heirs of the deceased had refused to accept it, he invested in
Confederate certificates in 1864; held, not liable; Covington v. Lattimore, 88 N. C.
407 (1883), supra note 29; Grant v. Reese, 94 N. C. 720 (1886) where an administrator was charged with the reasonable hire of slaves (in Confederate currency)
for the years 1863 and. 1864, in the absence of evidence where he actually rented
them out.
'57 N. C. 32 (1858).
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loss was shown as a result of the change. The opinion expressly states
that the fact that the trustee was personally interested in the trust fund
raised "a presumption that . . . [he] was doing what he believed to be
for the best."
In Sheets v. Tobacco Co., 41 probably the leading case in this State
on the subject of trust investments, a guardian invested $9,000 in the
preferred stock of the tobacco company. The stock depreciated, and the
wards sued the company for the $9,000, plus interest, less dividends paid.
A judgment for the plaintiffs was reversed and a new trial ordered,
because of the trial court's refusal to submit defendant's issues as to
the good faith and diligence of the guardian in making the investment.
The Court says 42 that if there is any liability, it is primarily that of
the guardian. The opinion quotes with approval the Massachusetts
rule, 4 3 and states :44
"A guardian is generally authorized to make any investment of funds
in his hands, belonging to his ward, which, in his best judgment, arrived
at in good faith and after the exercise of due diligence, will secure the
principle of said fund, and yield a reasonable income therefrom for the
benefit of his ward's estate."
The clarity of this expression of the rule is somewhat impaired by an
immediately preceding statement:
"The fact that he has made an investment . . . which he was
authorized to make, does not relieve him of liability for losses sustained
by reason of such investment, if in making the particular investment he
failed to act in good faith and with due diligence."
The two expressions, taken together, seem to involve some circuity. But
they do leave unimpaired the requirements of good faith and due dili45
gence to which the Court has adhered since its earliest decisions.
Loans on Personal Security:
In Boyett v. Hurst,46 a guardian loaned money to a partnership,
taking notes signed by both partners. He was held liable. The Court
"1195 N. C. 149, 141 S. E. 355 (1928).
'Id. at 154, 141 S. E. at 358.
As classically stated in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446: "He is to
observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs,
not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their
funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital
to be invested."
" Id. at 152, 141 S. E. at 357.
'Cf. Troy v. Troy, 45 N. C. 85 (1852) where the Court speaks (at 87) of the
power of equity courts to decree the sale of lands held in trust in a proper case, and
to direct the reinvestment of the proceeds in other lands or "perhaps" in "stocks."
Later cases throw no light upon this statement, and it is a question as to how
seriously it should be taken. See also Tayloe v. Tayloe, 108 N. C. 69, 12 S. E. 836

(1891), infra (General Considerations in Managing the Estate).
For a broad investment provision by the settlor, under which the trustee apparently retained stocks, see Commercial Nat. Bk. v. Alexander, 188 N. C. 667,
125 S. E. 385 (1924).
-654 N. C. 167 (1854).
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construed the statutory requirement of "good and sufficient security"
(under the then form of Section 2308) as requiring that the investment
be secured by the obligation of some person in addition to the borrower.
In this decision, the-Court also intimates that, where the guardian rented
lands and negroes belonging to the estate to his ward for the last three
years of the ward's minority, and took the latter's notes for the rents, he
47
was liable. This case should be compared with Watson v. Holton,
where a guardian loaned estate funds, taking A's bond with B as surety.
A and B were partners, but each had property other than the partnership
property. Both failed, and the guardian was relieved of liability. The
Court found that the requirement laid down in Boyett v. Hurst had
been met.
In Nelson v. Hall,48 the executor was directed by the will to keep a
certain fund "at interest in good bonds to my executor fbr the education
and support of all my children." He took two notes for $1806.79 and
$659 respectively from A, B and C, and a note of $50 on which D was
principal and E surety. All the parties failed suddenly. The Court
found no want of care on the part of the executor, and stated :4
"Executors should not be held responsible as insurers; all that a
sound public policy requires is that they shall act in good faith and use
ordinary care."
A guardian, in Hurdle v. Leath,50 loaned $2435 on the bill single of
A, with B as surety. The loan was made in 1860. In 1866, he procured
three more sureties. Upon his accounting, the guardian tried to make
it appear that all four of the sureties were original parties, and examined
his witnesses as to their solvency in 1860. He was held liable. His
procuring the other three sureties in 1866 was thought to be evidence
that he knew the security was insufficient, and of his negligence in not
taking immediate steps to collect the debt.r'
The same guardian loaned $2135 on the bill single of X, with Y as
surety. X's credit was good; Y's, "doubtful." It was held that Y's
obligation was not "sufficient security" within the statute.
In Camp v. Smith, 52 an executor received a $3000 bond of P, with S
"115 N. C. 36, 20 S. E. 611 (1894).

19Id. at 34.

- 58 N. C. 32 (1859).

-'63 N. C. 597 (1869).

old form of §2308 (Rxv. CODE (1854) c. 54, §23) contained a requirement
that "when the debtor or his sureties are likely to become insolvent, the guardian
shall use all lawful means to enforce payment thereof, on pain of being liable for
the same." For decisions under this provision, see, for example, Williamson v.
Williams, 59 N. C. 62 (1860); Hurdle v. Leath, supra; McNeill v. Hodges, 83
N. C. 505 (1880).
For cases involving delay in collection by fiduciaries other than guardians, see,
for example, Davis v. Marcum, 57 N. C. 189 (1858), and Jennings v. Copeland,
90 N. C. 572 (1884).
"68 N. C. 537 (1873).
'The
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as surety, as part of the estate of his decedent. He procured a renewal
bond of the same parties, running to him in his fiduciary capacity. Five
years later, P was insolvent, and S in good standing. At the latter's
request, the executor surrendered the bond in return for S's individual
bond. He was held liable.
In Freeman v. Wilson,53 a guardian received from the estate of his
ward's father, two notes, each signed by three makers, all of large
means. However, their property consisted mostly of slaves, and they
owed more than the value of their lands. In December, 1862, the guardian exchanged these two notes for the note of F, payable to him as
guardian, with F's son as surety. F was wealthy; his son was not. In
holding the guardian not liable, the Court remarks that, even though the
son was not a "good" security, the exchange "was not only honest, but
seems to have been fortunate." The decision would seem to involve a
good bit of the "hindsight" standard.
In the same case, the guardian, finding that part of the estate consisted of the note of A, without security, procured a note from A
running to himself as guardian. A was a man of large means. The
guardian was held liable for failure to obtain "sufficient security."
In Coggins v. Flythe,54 a guardian rented land to A in 1873, and
took A's note for the rent, with B and C as sureties. The note was due
January 1, 1874. At the time the note was executed, B and C were
reputed to be solvent, but large judgments had been docketed against
C during 1872 and 1873. In 1872, and again in 1875, the guardian had
found it necessary to sue the same parties on other obligations. He held
the note for more than two years after its maturity before suing, and
was surcharged for want of ordinary care in the management of the
estate.
A survey of these cases would seem to indicate that, while a guardian
is expressly required by statute to obtain "sufficient security" on personal loans, the same requirement applies to other types of fiduciaries
as part of "ordinary prudence." Certainly that is the safest course for
a trustee to pursue if he lends estate funds out on individual notes.
Loans on Mortgage Security:
Prior to the Civil War, a guardian took a note, secured by a mortgage on three slaves, worth considerably more than the amount of the
debt. According to State ex rel. Whitford v. Foy,5 5 that constituted
"sufficient security" within the meaning of the statute.
In State ex rel. Torrence v. Davidson,5 6 an administrator, - (who was
also a distributee), received as part of the estate four notes of one G.
- 113 N. C. 103, 18 S. E. 96 (1893).
a74 N. C. 368 (1876).
- 92 N. C. 437 (1885).
:65 N. C. 265 (1871).
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Knowing that G was heavily indebted, the administrator sought to effect
a settlement, and, after repeated efforts, secured a mortgage on certain
land, then of ample value, in consideration of an additional loan and
an extension of time. The property declined in value and the administrator, expecting improvement, delayed foreclosure. He finally foreclosed and bought in the land. The Court felt that he had acted with
good faith and reasonable diligence.
In Syrne v. Badger,5 7 an executrix received as part of the estate a
note of M, with sureties. Considering the debt unsafe, she required M
to execute a new note, with other sureties (I and T). She later sued on
the new note and recovered judgment. In exchange for the judgment,
she accepted a note, secured by a mortgage on the lands of I and T.
Later, I substituted a new mortgage on lands of greater value. The note
and mortgages were taken in the name of the executrix as an individual.
She believed the mortgages to be ample security, and delayed foreclosure under the mistaken belief that she was entitled to the whole
debt as distributee. After her death, her administrator foreclosed. The
Court held that her estate was not liable for the loss. She had exercised
good faith and due diligence, and, since she had believed that she was
dealing with her own property, she had not converted the funds by taking
the note and mortgages in her individual name 58
In McEachern v. Stewart,59 a clerk of court, who was directed to
invest in real estate or United States bonds, loaned money to his brother
and took a third mortgage on land, on which he, individually, held a
second mortgage. Both the first and second mortgages were long overdue, and no payments of principal or interest had ever been made on
them. The loan was applied in reduction of the first mortgage. Neither
the court nor the beneficiaries were informed of the nature of the investment. The clerk was held liable, and the third mortgage decreed
to be a charge on the land (which the clerk had bought in through an
-92 N. C. 706 (1885).
t' This case is probably unique in this State in holding no "devastavit" where the
fiduciary took securities in his own name individually. The Court explains the
particular hardship of the situation in Syme v. Badger, 96 N. C. 197, 205, 2 S. E.
61, 64 (1887). In this respect the case illustrates that even strict rules will be
waived by the courts where the facts are particularly appealing.
Cf. State ex rel. Whitford v. Foy, 65 N. C. 265 (1871) (A guardian failed to
have notes received from the estate of his ward's father transferred into his name
as guardian. Held, no conversion.); Jennings v. Copeland, 90 N. C. 572 (1884)
(A guardian purchased a note and took an assignment in his individual capacity.
Held, conversion.) ; Ogburn v. Wilson, 93 N. C. 115 (1885) ; Summers v. Reynolds,
95 N. C. 404 (1886) (An executor deposited estate funds in a bank and took
certificates of deposit in his own name. Held, conversion.) ; also Younce v. McBride, 68 N. C. 532 (1873); Winborne v. White, 69 N. C. 253, 262 (1873); and
'Beam v. Froneberger, 75 N. C. 540 (1876) (cases involving conveyances of land
to a trustee individually).
W114 N. C.370, 19 S. E. 702 (1894).
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agent on foreclosure). The opinion states that "trust funds must be
managed exclusively in the interest of the beneficiary, and cannot be
employed so as to work a benefit or profit to the trustee."
6 ° is the only case found in the reports dealing with
Cobb v. Fountain
a mortgage on foreign realty. The complaint alleged that defendant
guardian had loaned $2400 to a South Carolina resident; that he took a
mortgage on South Carolina realty as security; that he never had reported the investment to the court; and that the note was overdue. The
guardian demurred on the ground that there was no allegation of want
of good faith and due diligence. The demurrer was held to have been
properly overruled. The Court said :61
"As it is more prudent for a guardian to invest trust funds in his
own State, where they may be kept under his immediate observation and
within the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, we think the investment
of his ward's money in securities which are beyond the jurisdiction
should be disapproved unless made under rare and exceptional circumstances."
And again :2
"While not disposed to hold that a guardian may never invest his
ward's funds beyond the jurisdiction of the domestic courts, we are of
[the] opinion that such investment is prim facie improper and that
upon proof thereof it is incumbent upon him, at the risk of an adverse
verdict if he fail, to proceed with evidence tending to show that he has
faithfully performed the duties imposed by his trust."6 3
Investment in a Business:
In Fisher v. Fisher,6 4 the decedent's estate was found to be so embarrassed by debts and liens that it was considered necessary to place it
under the control of competent business management. A receiver was
appointed by the court, and directed to invest $50,000 in a modem business building. He actually expended approximately $60,000, but reported to the court periodically as the building progressed and had his
reports approved. He was held not to be liable to surcharge, the
Court reciting the rule with which we are now familiar.
The receiver also invested $8,000 in a bank of which he was president. He did so by order of the court and with the approval of the
life beneficiary. In holding him not liable, the Court admitted that "the
-187 N. C. 335, 121 S. E. 614 (1924).

InId. at 338, 121 S. E. at 615.
. Id. at 339, 121 S. E. at 616.
'The Court has adopted the general rule elsewhere. 3 BOGERT, op. Cit. Supra
note 1, §673;

at 141, 250.

McKINNEY, op. cit. supra note

1, at 41;

LOING, op. cit. supra note 1,

Isler v. Brock, 134 N. C. 428, 46 S. E. 951 (1904) contains a court order directing a trustee to invest in first mortgages on land.
170 N. C. 378, 87 S. E. 113 (1915).
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rule undoubtedly is that a trustee is not allowed of his own will to invest
a trust fund in his own individual enterprise." 65
In North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Wilson,66 the railroad company, to
secure its bonds, conveyed all its property to a trustee. The trustee was
directed to deposit sinking funds in a designated bank or in "some other
depository which shall be, in his judgment, safe." He was also given
the discretion to invest such funds in securities recommended to him
by the president or directors of the company. Without any prior
authorization from the president or directors of the company, the trustee
deposited $40,000 with a banking firm of which he was senior partner,
and selected certain notes held by the firm as collateral. Later, when
the firm became embarrassed, he refrained from withdrawing the funds
for fear of further embarrassing it. In holding him liable for breach of
trust, the Court announced that "trust funds must be managed exclusively in the interest of the beneficiary, and can not be appropriated
to the use of the trustee, or of any firm of which he is a member, or in
'67
which he has a contingent interest.
In Costner v. Piedmont Cotton Mills Co., 68 a trustee in bankruptcy
loaned trust funds to the cotton company, of which he was secretary,
treasurer, and a director. Upon the failure of the company, he sought
to have his claim allowed as a preference. It was denied, the Court
indicating that the investment was wrongful.
Bank Deposits:
According to the decision in Summers v. Reynolds,60 an executor
who deposits estate funds in a bank and takes certificates in his own
name, individually, is guilty of converting the funds. The Court further
intimates that the same is true, even when he opens an account in his
70
own name, but deposits only trust funds.
That the same rule of good faith and reasonable diligence applies to
deposits of trust funds in banks is apparent from the decision in Pierce
v. Pierce.7 1 There a guardian deposited funds of his ward in a bank,
Cf. Peyton v. Smith, 22 N. C. 325 (1839) ; Shuford v. Ramsour, 63 N. C. 622

(1869); Winstead v. Stanfield, 68 N. C. 40 (1873); Ogburn v. Wilcox, 93 N. C.
115 (1885) ; State ex rel. Carr v. Askew, 94 N. C. 194 (1886) ; Fisher v. Brown,
135 N. C. 198, 47 S. E. 398 (1904).
"81 N. C. 223 (1879).
"Cf. cases cited note 65.

63155 N. C. 128, 71 S. E. 85 (1911).
-95 N. C. 404 (1886).
"'In Shipp v. Hettrick, 63 N. C. 329 (1869), the Court said (at 331) that, if

the executor (who had mingled estate funds with his own) had made a general

deposit of estate moneys in a bank in his own name, it could not have relieved him;
but otherwise, if he had made a special deposit. Again in State ex rel. Lippard v.
Roseman, 72 N. C. 427 (1875), the Court said (at 429) that a guardian (who had
mingled estate funds with his own) -was in no better position than as if he had
made a general deposit of the money in a bank in his own name. Cf. Peyton v.
'Smith, 22 N. C. 325 (1839) ; cases cited note 58.
197 N. C. 348, 148 S.E. 438 (1929).
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and his account, showing the deposit, was approved by the clerk. In a
suit against the guardian and his sureties by the wards, the judgment
was reversed and a new trial awarded because of the trial court's failure
to submit the issues of good faith and due care. The Court seems to
72
overlook the point that was raised in State ex rel. Collins v. Gooch
where a deposit -by a guardian in a Virginia bank was held wrongful
on two grounds: (1) that the bank deposit does not comply with the
statutory requirement of "sufficient security," and (2) that it was
negligent to make the deposit in an out-of-the-state bank where the
guardian couldn't keep in constant touch with the bank's condition.
7
This latter point was overruled in the case of Moore v. Eure. 3 A
North Carolina executrix died, leaving estate funds deposited in a
Virginia bank. The administrator de bonis non, a Virginia resident,
continued the deposit and added to it, after having transferred it into
his name as administrator. The bank failed, and the administrator was
not held liable, some weight being attached to the fact that both he and
his firm kept their own funds in the same bank.
74
In State ex rel. Roebuck v. National Surety Co., a bank was ap-

pointed guardian and deposited the ward's funds with itself, setting up
an account in its guardianship name. Upon its failure, it was held
liable because it had failed to invest the funds, and because it had intermingled the funds with its own, and thereby converted them. Later
cases 7" refer to the doctrine of that case, and yet give no inkling as to
which of the two reasons given was relied upon. Again, no mention
was made of the statutory requirement of security, which was, however,
relied upon in the latter case of State ex rel. Bane v. Nicholson,"6 where
the guardian, with admitted good faith, deposited the entire estate in a
six-percent savings account.
The Court in this last case 77 apparently approves a temporary deposit, while the funds are awaiting investment or are needed for current
78
use. This point is reaffirmed in Marrinerv. Mizzelle, qualified by the
familiar requirements of good faith and diligence. But again, the
Court takes pains to indicate that a deposit for a fixed period is a loan
without security, and improper.
101 N. C. 11, 7 S. E. 471 (1888).
N. C. 186, 1 S. E. 653 (1887).
N. C. 196, 156 S. E. 531 (1930).
" State ex rel. Quinton v. Cain, 203 N. C. 162, 165 S. E. 543 (1932); In re
297

7'200

Home Savings Bk., 204 N. C. 454, 168 S. E. 688 (1933).

If the Court relied upon the mingling feature, it seems that it did so in disregard

of actual banking practice. Furthermore, when the bank received the money after
the account was set up, it did so in its capacity as depository, not as guardian. It
therefore could treat it as if it had been deposited by an outside fiduciary. See

Whitmore, Self-Deposit by Trust Companies of Fiduciary Funds (1934) 12 N. C.
L. REv. 350.
'203 N. C. 104, 164 S. E. 750 (1932).
Id. at 106, 164 S. E. at 751.

8207 N. C. 34, 175 S. E. 711 (1934).
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Whether or not the Court would adhere to the requirement of security for bank deposits in the case of any but guardians, (as seemed to be
the conclusion to be drawn from the cases involving loans on personal
security), is not clear. At least the fiduciary other than guardians
would be wise to avoid depositing estate moneys in a bank except
temporarily.
Advice of the Court:
One safe procedure is open to the trustee who is at loss to know his
powers and the proper move to make. He may petition the court for
advice and instructions. The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred
to the equity jurisdiction of the Superior Court to entertain such proceedings.7 9 And the protection afforded the trustee is apparently complete. A dictum in the Sheets Cases0 states that if the investment was
made pursuant to an order of the court, the trustee cannot be held liable
for any loss resulting therefrom, in the absence of fraud or gross
negligence-the same protection offered the trustee who invests within
the statutory lists. Not only that, but, according to the early case of
Washington v. Emery,81 if he fails to obtain such a court order and acts
on his own initiative, "he takes upon himself the onus of proving entire
bona fides, and that under the circumstances there was reasonable
ground to believe that the fund would be benefited." The end is worthy
of the means.
Apparently a trustee is equally protected who reports his investment
to the court and has his account approved.8 2 This course, however,
contains the obvious pitfall of non-approval, and, in at least one case,88
the wisdom of the investment was permitted to be raised even after such
approval.
The wisdom of permitting a trustee to pass the investment buck to
the courts is questionable. The subject of investments is one of the
most highly technical fields in modern economics. It is a subject about
which the average judge has relatively little personal knowledge. It is
a subject which requires years of study before the data, upon which
intelligent decisions must be made, can even be understood. It is submitted that a court could hardly be asked to consider a more complex
See, for instance, Commercial Nat. Bk. v. Alexander, 188 N. C. 667, 125 S. E.
385 (1924) and Wachovia Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Edwards, 193 N. C. 118, 136 S. E. 342
(1927). But cf. Gary v. Cannon, 38 N. C. 64, 69 (1843), where the Court says:
"The Court ... never undertakes to dictate to whom a guardian shall lend money,
nor how long he shall lend it to a particular person. The investments are in the
guardian's discretion, as they are upon his responsibility."
McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §69.

195 N. C. 149, 154, 141 S. E. 355, 358 (1928).

- 57 N. C. 32 (1858).

' See State ex reL. Collins v. Gooch, 97 N. C. 186, 190, 1 S. E. 653, 656 (1887).
' Pierce v. Pierce, 197 N. C. 348, 148 S. E. 438 (1929), supra (Bank Deposits).
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set of evidence than should be presented to him if he is to give the
advice that the interests of the beneficiary deserves. Why then should
an already overworked judiciary be shouldered with the responsibility
of giving such advice? If the proceeding is handled summarily, as it
needs must be in many, if not most, cases, nothing but blame can be
expected for our judicial system. Should the courts be burdened with
the responsibility of advising trustees as to investments any more than
they should have to assume such responsibility as to insurance companies, banks, or public funds? The answer seems clear enough.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS IN MANAGING THE ESTATE

The material under this heading, while not strictly involving the
problem of investing trust funds, is so closely connected with that
subject that it deserves at least passing mention.
The power of a fiduciary to retain investments turned over to him
as part of the estate, to exchange investments, and to liquidate improper
or doubtful investments, is undoubtedly tested by the same general
standard that is so steadfastly applied in the case of initial investment
or reinvestment.8 4 The assets of the estate must be watched constantly
for changes detrimental to the interests of the 'beneficiaries.
The estate funds must never be mingled with the trustee's own or
other moneys. 85 They must be kept separate and intact, and the trustee
should make no move which can8 6raise even a suspicion that he is using
the estate for his own purposes.
Title to the funds must always be kept openly in the name of the
estate, or in the name of the trustee as representative of the estate8T
As appeared in the cases involving bank deposits, even though the estate
is kept separate from other funds, if it stands in the name of the trustee
individually, he is deemed to have converted the funds.
" No North Carolina cases have been found dealing directly with the retention
of investments. On exchange, see Christman v. Wright, 38 N. C. 549, 553 (1845).
Many of the cases discussed supra involve exchanges, particularly those under

Confederate Securities and Currency, and Loans on Personal Security. Cases cited
in note 51 specifically deal with the liquidation aspect.
For general discussions, see Notes (1927) 4 Wis. L. RFv. 111; (1930) 30 CoL.
L. Rr.v. 1166; (1930) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 77; (1933) 19 VA. L. REv. 630; 3
BOGERT, op. cit. s pra note 1, §683 et seq.; McKINNEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 32;
1 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §§227-231.
0 See State ex reL Cummings v. Mebane, 63 N. C. 315 (1869); Shipp v.
Hettrick, 63 N. C. 329 (1869) ; Winstead v. Stanfield, 68 N. C. 40 (1873) ; State
ex reL. Wells v. Sluder, 70 N. C. 55 (1874) ; State ex rel. Lippard v. Roseman, 72
N. C. 427 (1875) ; Burke v. Turner, 85 N. C. 500 (1881) ; Dunn v. Dunn, 137 N. C.
533, 50 S. E. 212 (1905) ; Duffie v. Williams, 148 N. C. 530, 62 S. E. 611 (1908);
State ex re. Roebuck v. National Surety Co., 200 N. C. 196, 156 S. E. 531 (1930);
3 Bo ERT, op. cit. supra note 1, §§596, 612; McKINNEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 24.
Cf. Whitmore, supra note 75.
8oSee cases cited note 65; 3 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 1, §612; MCKINmKY,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 23.
1
See cases cited note 58.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The trustee is not permitted to represent his own interests on the one
hand, and those of the estate on the other. In the case of Tayloe 2,.
Tayloe,8 8 an administrator received as part of the estate a $1000 share
of stock in a school. The stock had no market value, and, having been
ordered to sell by the court, he offered it at public sale, and, thinking it
worthless, bid it in himself for $103. It was admitted that he acted in
entire good faith. When it later appeared that the stock might have
been redeemed for its face value, the administrator was held liable for
that amount. The Court said that an administrator may not purchase
for himself, even though he acts in good faith, fairly, and pays a fair
price.
One further illustration of the business judgment demanded of a
fiduciary may be of interest. An executor held a judgment for $252 as
part of the estate. He was approached by the judgment debtor's son,
who offered to compromise the judgment. The executor stated that
he had no power to make such a compromise. The judgment was sold
at public auction, and brought $1. It was later compromised by the
purchaser for $150, and the executor was held liable for the difference.
(It is true that other dealings of the executor exhibited a want of good
faith, and the Court was unquestionably influenced by that showing.)so
CONCLUSIONS
It would help greatly if, on the basis of these helter-skelter statutes
and decisions, the North Carolina law of trust investments could, in
the light of experience, be overhauled and comprehensively codified.
But, at best, that would go only part of the way.
In the hands of the better trust companies, broad and discretionary
powers over trust investments can be safely and effectively exercised.
The specialized knowledge and experience of their investment officers,
and their continuity of administration, may be expected to develop
standards which no body of law can establish. For the protection of
clients of the weaker companies, stricter inspections of investment
practices by state and national bank examiners may be necessary.
The position of the individual, non-professional trustee calls loudest
for change. The family lawyer or other confidant cannot command the
requisite technical skill in investment matters.
For those settlors who do not desire to leave the carrying out of their
trusts to the better trust companies, the state should set up a Public
108 N. C. 69, 12 S. E. 836 (1891).
"Summers v. Reynolds, 95 N. C.404 (1886). See also Grant v. Reese, 94 N. C.
720 (1886), where an administrator was held liable for selling a judgment, obtained by him against a solvent estate, for about half its amount.
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Trustee. Some of the Australasian states have had such an office for
more than fifty years; England, since 1908. Mr. Gilbert Stephenson,
who has best described the work of the Public Trustee in England,90
thinks such an institution is not needed in any of the United States, but
his judgment is affected by his natural enthusiasm for the services
rendered by the better type of American trust company. The chaotic
and precarious condition of individual trustee administration in this

country, however, makes the establishment of some such agency
inevitable.
I ENGLISH EXECUTOR AND TRUSTEE BUSINESS (1930) 52-84; reviewed in (1931)
9 N. C L. REv. 488.

